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''A Question of Relevance''
The Establishment of a Canadian
Parachute Capability, 1942-1945
Bernd Horn
'''T"he great trouble with starting anything
J. new," argued Brigadier-General William
Mitchell, "is to break away from the conservative
policy of those who have gone before." 1 His
observation was born from his own experience
as a result of the inertia which existed in the interwar years. Not surprisingly, Canada did little
during this period to ensure that it was capable
of participating in a modern war. The vacuum of
peace was insufficient to overcome the vacillation
of military and political decision makers. It was
only the stunning German victories of 19391940, which provided the catalyst for change and
a template of what a modern army required.
Predictably, Canadian officers serving
overseas in the cauldron ofEurope, in May 1940,
formed distinct impressions of the new
techniques of warfare which had been showcased.
The use of airborne forces was one such
innovation but proposals to establish a Canadian
parachute capability were quickly rejected. The
senior military command could not visualize a
role for these special troops. More important,
there existed an explicit institutional hostility
towards the concept. Conventional military
minds spurned the distinct, special or unique,
and paratroops were seen as a distraction to the
serious business of building an army.
Nonetheless, the persistent efforts of Colonel
E.L.M. Burns, greatly assisted by a growing
American and British interest in airborne forces,
eventually resulted in the organization of a
modest Canadian parachute capability. The
reason for this abrupt change is shrouded by
inconsistencies. The relevance of a distinct
Canadian airborne force was never credibly
rationalized. The fact that at war's end it was

quickly dismantled provided silent testimony to
its perceived utility.
This was the reality of the Canadian airborne
experience. Despite the actual performance and
unrivalled reputation of the nation's
paratroopers, they never gained the full
acceptance of the military establishment. This
became the legacy of Canada's airborne soldiers.
Their existence ebbed and flowed on the basis of
political expediency and powerful personalities.
The failure to rationalize a realistic need for
airborne forces, and develop a doctrine which
would guide their employment, would remain a
weakness which would be the root of their
eventual destruction.
The Canadian indifference to parachute
troops in the interwar period is not surprising.
With the exception of Russian and later German
experimentation, airborne ideas did not figure
largely in the thinking of military commanders
in Britain or the United States, much less
Canada. However, this lethargy, which in England
and in the United States was cloaked in a mantle
of slow study and experimentation, was shattered
by the chaos of events in Europe. British Air Chief
Marshal Sir John Slessor recalled that the "bold
and brutal" German airborne operations in
Norway and the Low Countries, in the Spring of
1940, deeply impressed everyone, notably Prime
Minister Winston Churchill. 2 These events
became the catalyst for action.
As early as 6 June 1940, Churchill assailed
his staff with proposals to develop a corps "of
parachute troops on a scale of equal to five
thousand. ":l Winston Churchill, himself an
accomplished adventurer, journalist and soldier,
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Early Training of Canadian Paratroopers: (clockwise
from top left): Aspiring paratroopers conduct static line
descents. Note the "Riddel .. football helmets and coveralls
usedfor jumping; High tower training conducted to practice
landings. Fort Benning, Georgia, Autumn 1942; A wind
machine was used to simulate a parachutist being dragged
upon landing due to an iriflated canopy on a windy day;
Mock-up of a aircraft fuselage used to train Canadian
parachutists the proper exit drills. Fort Benning. Autumn
1942; Tower training used to practice exiting an aircraft.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol8/iss4/4

2

Horn: “A Question of Relevance”: The Establishment of a Canadian Parach

held a heroic and romantic image of war. His
concept of conflict was irretrievably moulded
during the South African War of 1899-1902. To
Churchill, the offensive was all that mattered. He
believed that audacity and willpower constituted
the only sound approach to the conduct ofwar. 4
Churchill became the stimulus for the
establishment of paratroopers in the British
Army. However. it was not an easy task.
Lieutenant-General Frederick 'Boy' Browning, an
alacritous advocate for the establishment of
British airborne forces, recalled, "Very early we C'-1
came to certain definite conclusions which we 8
0')
have kept before us ever since and for which we ;:::
may rightly say we have fought many a stout battle b:
against the doubters and unbelievers: it is always CJ
the same with anything new and there is nothing i
curious about that." 5
The vehement resistance from the majority
of Churchill's military commanders necessitated
the Prime Minister's continual prodding for
progress reports to ensure headway was being
made. The opposition was initially so deeprooted, that Churchill suggested to Anthony
Eden, the British Secretary of State for War, that
a case should be made of "one or two" of the
reluctant officers to set an example for the
others.ri Nonetheless, the airborne detractors met
with limited success. They convinced the Prime
Minister to be satisfied, in the beginning at any
case, with a parachute corps of five hundred men
instead of five thousand. 7
Not surprisingly, the Canadian record is
similar to the British. As already noted, prior to
the commencement of hostilities no effort. either
conceptually or in practise, was expended in
Canada in the investigation of an airborne
capability. The idea of developing a Canadian
parachute force was first raised by Colonel E.L.M.
Burns, in August 1940, upon his return from
England.
Colonel Burns was recognized as a soldier
of great ability and intellect, although one virtually
without personality. 8 During the interwar years
he was a prolific writer and actively participated
in the academic debate on mechanization and
the character of modern war. Despite his
progressive ideas, Bums never contemplated the
employment of paratroopers, or the use of air
power to transport infantry tactically. 9 He did,

Following the success of German paratroopers during
the attack on the Low Countries in May 1940. E.L.M.
Bums became a major advocate for the creation qf
a Canadian parachute capability.

however, share J.F.C. Fuller's notion of"motor
guerillas" to conduct raids on the enemy's
headquarters and lines of communications (the
"brains and nerves" of an opponent's army). 10
Thus, he demonstrated early on an appreciation
for the importance of "Deep Battle." This would
prove important to his later support of parachute
troops.
Colonel Bums' experience overseas, both on
the Continent and in England, was instrumental
to the eventual genesis of a Canadian airborne
capability. His earlier writing demonstrated that
he grasped the importance and utility of striking
an enemy's command and logistical facilities. The
successful utilization of German paratroopers in
April-May 1940 now revealed a viable tool to
accomplish this aim. Burns believed that "the
successes obtained by the Germans with airborne troops seem to show that this will become
a regular method of warfare. "11
Of equal significance to Burns, in regard to
the importance of the newly emerging airborne
troops, was the subsequent parachute scare
which erupted in the aftermath of the German
aerial onslaught. The German Fallschirmjagers,
by virtue of their stunning accomplishments,
were quickly perceived by the military and general
public as invincible. This created a wave of
29
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Airborne soldiering was very physically
demanding. Only 30 percent of those
volunteering to become paratroopers were
accepted. Of those who passed. a further 35
percent were lost during training.

Determined into
battle. A
paratrooper of 1st
Canadian
ParacluLte
Battalion leaves
the Drop Zone.

Sketches by
Ted Zuber
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A most irrevocable first step.
Paratroopers of 1st Canadian
Parachute Battalion exit a
C-47 Dakota.
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paranoia which infected the still unoccupied
territories in Europe, as well as in Britain. As
the remnants of the British Expeditionary Force
(BEF) and the 1st Canadian Division hastily
retreated to England, the threat of an imminent
invasion loomed large. "Invasion," conceded
Burns in his memoirs, "seemed fearfully close
in those days." 12 Inherent in that threat was the
imminent spectre of German Fallschirmjagers
dropping from the heavens.
Even the ever fiery and optimistic British
Prime Minister was not immune to the wave of
anxiety which swept through England. Winston
Churchill estimated the expected scale of
airborne attack at approximately 30,000
paratroopers. ~ In Britain, troop dispositions
were tailored to counter the envisioned airborne
invasion and vast amounts of scarce material was
invested to this aim. The government adopted a
policy in 1940 to safeguard the country by
ordering all open spaces (meaning virtually every
park and playing field) all over Britain to be
seeded with long spiked poles, concrete blocks
and other obstacles which would impede
paratroopers. 14
1 1

The Canadian Expeditionary Force in
England. now tasked with the defence of the
British Isles, was also very conscious of the
parachute menace. Canada's Overseas
Commander, Lieutenant-General A.G.L.
McNaughton stated that "invasion was a real
threat," and the Canadians were in essence, "a
mobile reserve with a 360 degree front. " 15 He
affirmed that they may have to operate anywhere
in Great Britain to meet seaborne or airborne
attacks.
This chaotic and desperate environment
deeply influenced Colonel Burns, when in July
1940, he returned to Canada at the direction of
Major-General Crerar, who himself was recalled
to take over the position of Chief of the General
Staff (CGS). Burns was appointed Assistant
Deputy CGS. The CGS tasked Bums with special
assignments concemed with the organization and
development of Canada's Army. An all out effort
now commenced. "With the fall of France,"
recounted Burns in his memoirs, "the limits
which had been imposed by the previous cautious
policy of Mr. Mackenzie King·s government were
set aside, and the question now was: how much
could we do within the limits of Canada's

manpower and political situation to build up and
train and equip those formations needed for the
task?" 16 Burns' fertile mind, enhanced by his
recent experience in Europe and Britain, now set
to work on modernizing an Army for the new
method of warfare.
Colonel Burns wasted little time. He believed
that parachute troops were "no longer just a
'stunt,"' but rather, because of their mobility, an
important element of any modern army. 17 On 13
August 1940, he submitted his first proposal for
the establishment of a Canadian airborne
capability to Colonel J.C. Murchie, the Director
of Military Operations in NDHQ. Murchie,
dismissed the idea. He expressed the concern
that "although the value ofthe parachute troops
in certain situations was very great, the provision
of such troops by Canada would be a project of
doubtful value to the combined Empire war effort
in view of the expenditure of time, money and
equipment which would be involved." 18 Colonel
Murchie further explained that any Canadian
parachute units would likely be part of a UK
Parachute Corps and as a result, be difficult to
administer and more importantly, would be
largely out of Canadian control during operations.
He counselled that "if any additional
commitments are accepted these should be
limited to the formation of units to which
Canadians are particularly adapted by reason of
the nature of this country." 19
The issue of national command remained an
important one for Canadians during the Second
World War. General McNaughton fought fiercely
throughout his tenure to retain strict Canadian
control. "We had to keep the command in our
own hands," he insisted, "otherwise we would
have had a succession of people coming in and
the order and counter-order would have been
similar to what we'd been through on Salisbury
Plain in 1914." 20 McNaughton recalled the
struggle to claim national control over the
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) during the
Great War. Those successful efforts transformed
the CEF into a distinct national entity. Its
achievements fuelled national pride and a sense
of collective accomplishment. As a direct result,
over time the Canadian Corps became enshrined
in the minds of Canadians. McNaughton was
intent on applying that hard eamed lesson to the
present conflict. 21

31
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Colonel Bums remained undaunted despite
the initial rejection, as well as the larger issue of
national command. He submitted a second
memorandum to the CGS two weeks later. This
time, Burns wisely reverted to a venerable
Canadian approach when discussing a suggested
increase to the nation's military capability. He
cloaked his proposal in the mantle of home
defence. He argued:
In the defence of Canada against raids or a
serious attempt at invasion. they would be the
quickest means of building up a front against
an attacker, and also could harass his
communications. We have often thought of the
problem of preventing an enemy from
establishing a base for supplying submarines
in remote sections of the coast which could not
easily be reached by land. If we had even a
battalion of Paratroops who could be landed to
counter-attack such bases, it would make their
establishment very much more difficult for an
enemy; it would probably be necessary for him
to send about a brigade of troops for land
defences. 22

Burns further attempted to sweeten the idea
by emphasizing the stimulating effect that
parachute training would have on the morale of
the public and the armed servicesY The year
1940 was a very low period for the Allies. Defeats,
retreats and withdrawals, seemed to be all there
was. Perhaps, Burns thought, the training of a
corps of aggressive and inherently offensiveminded paratroopers, could be a potential tonic
to the war effort.
General Crerar, although in apparent
philosophical agreement with the concept of
creating an airborne force, replied, "It is not a
project of importance to the winning of the war
just now." 24 He directed that the matter be set
aside and brought forward to his attention in
three months time. Colonel Burns faithfully
staffed yet another paper to the Chief of the
General Staff on 12 November 1940. He
reiterated the points from his earlier submissions
and also emphasized the concept of paratroops
in the form of an enhanced military capability.
He asserted, "airborne troops are merely the
most mobile form of land forces, and the fact
that some of them land by parachute is due to
the characteristics of the aeroplane." 25
Significantly, in an attempt to win support
for his proposal, he linked his scheme to a

distinctly national orientation and theme. He
explained that "Canada is often claimed to be a
country essentially adapted to air transportwitness development of the Northland."
Therefore, "training air-borne troops." he argued,
"would be a development in line with the
emphasis on air training generally. "26 In this vein,
he also suggested, that Canada might make a
contribution in respect to the parachute training
which was then being conducted in EnglandY
Regardless of the varied approaches Colonel
Burns used to sell his plan for a Canadian
parachute capability, one key idea, which he felt
was central to understanding the airborne
concept, was repeatedly stressed. "We hope to
turn to the offensive against Germany some day."
explained Burns, "and it appears that full
advantage must be taken of all forms of mobility
in carrying out operations. "28 Unquestionably, to
Burns, paratroopers represented mobility and
offensive power. It also personified a modern
army. He argued passionately that airborne forces
"would be a step towards a 'quality' army, and
would show that we were actually doing
something to create a force with offensive
capabilities. "29
At this juncture, further exploration of the
concept was pursued. Crerar directed that the
views of both the War Office (UK) and the
Overseas Commander (McNaughton) be solicited.
The War Office promptly reported that parachute
troops were in fact being organized and that one
'special service battalion' was undergoing active
training. The British concept of employment was
explained as filling the role of Light Cavalry to
"seize bridge crossings, defiles and aerodromes
well in advance of the slower-moving main body
of the army." 30 Lieutenant-General McNaughton
felt that the use of airborne troops had distinct
possibilities. Moreover, he favoured the idea that
Canada "should commence the organization and
training of both parachute and glider-borne
troops." 31 However, he stated that he would
acquiesce to Major-General Crerar's decision.
Crerar in tum, proclaimed that he was "agreeable
to a proportion (say a platoon) in each infantry
battalion being trained in this work, [parachuting]
[but] he is not in favour of training special
airborne units unless the War Office make specific
requests for them. which is unlikely. ":12 As a
consequence no further action was undertaken.

32
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Left: The bicycle was considered one means of
overcoming the airborne's Achilles' heeL, namely
mobility. Pictured is Pte. Tom Phelan at the
reinforcement camp of 1st Canadian Parachute
Battalion as he recovers from wounds suffered
on 16 June 1944 at le Mesnil, France.
Above: Officers qf 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion,
Greven, Germany, 4 April1945. (L. tor.): Lt. W.A.
Jenkins, Capt. P.G. Costigan, Lts. G.A. Menn, G.J.
Fisher, A.O. Tucker.
NAC PA 204971

In sum, Colonel Burns' aspirations at
establishing a Canadian airborne capability were
fraught with impediments. His attempts at
marketing, and later repackaging, the need and
utility of parachute troops met limited success.
The greatest obstacle was the failure to convince
the decision makers that a pervasive role, which
was worthy of warranting the expenditure of
scarce resources, existed. As a result, in late
1940, the concept of an airborne force underwent
a hiatus for the next eight months. In was not
until the early part of August 1941, after Colonel
Burns was promoted and sent overseas, that the
idea resurfaced in the faceless tomb of National
Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). The reemergence is was inevitably linked to an Allied
change of heart. The startling success of the
German Fallschirmjagers, in their conquest of
the Mediterranean island of Crete, prompted the
British to adopt a more ambitious programme
for airborne forces. An update from the War Office
(UK) stated that a force of 2,500 parachutists
was to be formed and it even implied that this
number might be increased to a division-sized
organization. '33
The renewed attempt, however, was once
again suppressed by the latent enmity to

specialized troops who were perceived as lacking
a credible role. General McNaughton, who left a
previous impression, from the meeting in
December 1940, that he was actually inclined to
support airborne forces, now surprised many.
In response to the latest submission he declared,
"I do not advocate the establishment of any
separate parachute troops in the Canadian
Forces. "34 In McNaughton's view there was only
two reasons which justified the creation of a
special airborne force. The first was the
probability of early and continued employment
in a special role, and the second was the need
for specialized training on lines greatly different
from regular units. 35
Despite the perfunctory rejection by the
Canadian Overseas Commander, the renewed
airborne effort lingered. Amazingly, the reason
for the continued interest was not driven by the
Army, but rather the Royal Canadian Air Force
(RCAF). In October 1941, the RCAF began to
query National Headquarters in Ottawa in regard
to the policy being considered in respect to the
establishment of parachute troops. Furthermore,
the Air Force staff officers relayed an offer from
the Royal Air Force to provide instructors and
equipment to assist the Army in the event they
wished to proceed with training airborne forces.:16
33
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As no definitive answer was forthcoming, the
RCAF continued to forward a stream of messages
requesting an update on the Army's "airborne"
policy. In January 1942, Major-General Maurice
Pope, the Vice Chief ofthe General Staff(VCGS),
directed that the effort be indefinitely deferred
because the home army provided no scope for
the employment of parachute troops. 37 An
Appreciation on Air Landing Troops conducted
the same month reinforced Pope's assertion. It
declared that "parachute troops will not be
considered except in passing. Our operations at
home are largely static (coast defence), and, as a
consequence, do not provide scope for the
employment of parachute troops. "38 This belief
became institutionally entrenched. The annual
Army Programmes, for the period 1940 to 1944,
included no mention of airborne troops. More
important, in the discussion of forces for the
defence of Canada, absolutely no reference was
ever made to the employment of, or the
requirement for, paratroopers. 39
Remarkably, despite the repetitive assertions
that parachute troops were oflimited relevance
to the Canadian Army, a letter from Canadian
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in mid-February
1942 stated that, "the policy to be adopted by
the Canadian Army with regard to paratroop
training is [still] under consideration by NDHQ
at the moment. According to our latest
information no decision was to be given until this
matter had been thoroughly discussed with Lt.General McNaughton. "40 Apparently, the
continued efforts of the Royal Canadian Air Force
kept the issue of airborne troops alive. It was
not lost on the Air Force that paratroopers
required aircraft. And more aircraft meant an
expanded RCAF organization and role.
Although the issue continued to simmer, little
evident headway was made. In fact, the continuing
resistance to establishing a distinct Canadian
airbome capability was reinforced by none other
than the Minister of National Defence (MND) in
the spring of 1942. The Honourable J.L. Ralston
explained in the House of Commons that "the
formation of an actual paratroop unit is not being
gone ahead with at the present moment, but
rather the training of men so that they can be
used as paratroops when the time comes, with
additional training to be done with aircraft. "41
The policy seemed consistent. So too was the

continuing non-action in regard to the "training
of men" for paratroop employment.
However, two months later the dyke broke.
In early June, Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Keefler,
from the Directorate of Military Training, NDHQ,
was sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, to report on
the state of parachute training in the United
States. Coincident with the submission of his
final report, were discussions with Air Vice
Marshal Steadman of the RCAF, who had just
returned from a visit with the 6th (UK) Airborne
Division. As a result, Major-General Murchie,
reversed his earlier position and forwarded a
proposal to the Minister of National Defence for
nothing less than the organization of a parachute
battalion. 42
Approval was not long in coming. The War
Cabinet Committee gave its blessing on Canada
Day 1942. Astoundingly, the purpose of the unit
was conferred as home defence, specifically, "to
provide a means of recapture of aerodromes or
re-enforcements of remote localities by air-borne
troops. "43 The apparent inconsistency seemed to
go unnoticed. For years the rationale given for
the rejection of a distinct Canadian airborne
capability was based on its lack of relevance in
regard to the Home Army. Suddenly, at the same
time as the general strategic situation was
beginning to improve for the Allies, it was
professed that "the Army has a definite
requirement to train one battalion of 600
paratroops by 1st January 1943."44 A mere
month later, an assessment on the Army
requirement for gliders stated that a demand did
exist for paratroopers, but only one company in
strength. 45 Astoundingly, by early December
1942, the demand changed again. Now the
Directorate of Military Operations and Plans
(DMO & P) envisioned the need of approximately
1,000 personnel for airborne operations in
Canada, exclusive of the newly designated 1st
Canadian Parachute Battalion. 46
The coherence of military thought is
questionable. During the dark days of the war,
when Britain was at its weakest, when the
Commonwealth stood alone against the Axis
juggernaut, and when Canada had little in the
way of defensive forces, the mobility and rapid
reaction capability of airborne troops was
dismissed as irrelevant for use in Canada. A few

34
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Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser Eadie inspecting "C"
Company. 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion,
Kolkhagen, 24 April 1945.

years later, when the tide of the war shifted in
favour of the Allies, a decision was taken to
develop airborne forces, incredibly for a home lrl
defence role.
~

.....

The key to understanding the paradoxical
approach taken to the concept of a Canadian
airborne capability is not found in the "officially"
stated role. One must look beyond the rhetoric
and words. There was little conviction, either
militarily or politically, that Canada faced a
serious threat to its security. The home defence
role for the parachute force was used merely to
provide an acceptable rationale to convince
dubious military and political decision makers.
Fraser Eadie, who became the last Commanding
Officer (CO) of the 1st Canadian Parachute
Battalion, affirmed that there was consistent
opposition to the idea of a Canadian airborne
element. He asserted that the Minister of National
Defence finally agreed to the concept on the basis
that the force was designated for home defenceY
Despite the clear sales pitch, the definitive
"raison d'etre" was far from transparent. There
was never any question that the type of soldier
required for parachute training was the
aggressive individual who was anxious to serve
overseas. In fact, the acceptance of National
Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) volunteers,
for the lst Canadian Parachute Battalion, became
contingent on the respective individuals first
joining the 'Active Force. '48 This cleared the
"potential obstacle" of overseas service.
Further evidence of the turbid state of affairs
was given in early December in a note to the CGS.
In this correspondence his Deputy insisted, "I
do not consider that it is feasible at present to
decide the ultimate role of the 1st Parachute
B[attalio]n."49 Instead, he suggested that the unit
continue its training, which was not expected to
be completed prior to the end of March 1943, at
the earliest. Not surprisingly, even before the
newly formed parachute unit was deemed fit for
active service, overtures were made to the War
Office (UK) for its inclusion in a British airborne
formation. Fraser Eadie, the former paratroop
commander, recalled a telephone conversation
during this period with Major Jeff Nicklin, the

~.
~

~,:,j
er.:

::r:
cj

Z
.8
~

Battalion's Deputy Commanding Officer. Nicklin
confided that neither the Canadian government,
nor the Field Commanders in England, had any
idea what to do with the paratroopers and as a
result, they were being offered up to the British. 5°
On 18 March 1943, General Paget welcomed the
offer and stated the battalion could be included
in the establishment of a second British airborne
division which was forming. 51
It became apparent that the issue of national
control was a rather "hit and miss" notion in
regard to a Canadian parachute unit. The latest
turn in events also underscored another theme.
Namely, in Canada, the ultimate aim was never
to develop the airborne capability for use in the
country's defence. That was merely a sop to
placate the nay-sayers. The advocates wanted to
use it in the active theatres of Europe. Indeed,
airborne forces had become a symbol of modem
warfare. Moreover, they represented the cuttingedge of offensive action. The British, as a result
of their study of German Fallschirmjagers, viewed
parachute troops as "a highly mobile force of
shock troops which can be projected at short
notice into an enemy area which might otherwise
consider itself immune from attack." They saw
the airborne weapon solely in terms of the
offense. 52

The emphasis on the "offensive" seemingly
struck a chord with the Canadians. Colonel
Bums' original argument was finally accepted. It
is not coincidental that the decision to adopt a
35
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paratroop unit came at the same time that both
the Americans and British were overwhelmingly
committed to the large scale offensive use of
airborne forces. The British authorized the
establishment of an Airborne Division in
November 1941. The Americans converted the
82nd Motorized Infantry Division to the airbome
role on 26 June 1942. 53 Furthermore, the
airbome arm took on a public image of herculean
proportion. The change in thinking was clearly
reflected in the U.S. War Department's 1942
Strategy Book which stated:

result, even before the battalion completed its
collective training, or was declared operationally
ready, it was not only offered up to the British,
but was also warned offfor overseas duty. Despite
the unit's imminent departure, it was still
estimated that the paratroopers would need a
further two months' training in the United
Kingdom before the unit was fit for active service.
This sequence of events further underscored the
feebleness of the "airborne for home defence"
role. But there were not too many who made the
connection in wartime.

The lJse ofParachutists ... Nowadays one cannot
possibly hope to succeed in landing operations
unless one can be assured of the cooperation of
parachutists on a scale hitherto undreamed of.
In fact, only the parachutist will be able to take
enemy territory from the rear. thus preventing
destruction of the attacking forces by artillery
fire and enabling them to get a foothold on the
coast .... 25,000 men set down in advance at every
important point of attack should be able to do
the work, especially if it proves possible to get
them assembled. They must obviously be
regarded as the pivot of success of the entire
operation. 54

If the rationale to justify the establishment
of a parachute unit was questionable, the endproduct certainly was not. During the war the 1st
Canadian Parachute Battalion fought valiantly in
the Normandy Campaign, the Crossing of the
Rhine, and during the pursuit of enemy forces in
Northwest Europe. By war's end, the battalion
had eamed a proud and remarkable reputation
whose legacy would challenge Canada's future
paratroopers and imbue them with a special
pride. The Battalion never failed to complete an
assigned mission, nor did it ever lose or
surrender an objective once taken. The Canadian
paratroopers were among the first Allied soldiers
to land in occupied Europe and the only
Canadians to have participated in the 'Battle of
the Bulge' in 1944-45, in the Ardennes.
Additionally, by the end of the war they had
advanced deeper into Germany than any other
Canadian unit.

An element of the Canadian military wanted
to ensure they were part of the neophyte club.
An eloquent War Diary entry belies the
undercurrent of motive present. It elucidated, "We
members of the 1st Canadian Parachute
Battalion, are well aware of our unique position
as a newly born unit in a new phase of warfare.
We are therefore, confident of our success and
trust that we well be given the opportunity to
prove our value." 55 Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.P.
Bradbrooke, the first Commanding Officer of the
unit, clearly explained his understanding of his
battalion's purpose. He declared, "The
paratroopers are the tip of the spear. They must
expect to go in first, to penetrate behind enemy
lines and to fight in isolated positions."56 To the
military community, being a modern offensive
minded army meant, rightly or wrongly, the
possession of paratroops. Canada was now in
the game.

By March of 1943, Canada possessed a
battalion of highly motivated and trained
paratroopers, officially described as a "corps
elite. "57 The spectre of actually employing them
now became the issue. However, their official
"raison d'etre," home defence, as the critics had
always maintained, was not a requirement. As a

The unit's exemplary performance did little
to guarantee its future. With the end of hostilities
came the requirement for demobilization and the
dilemma of deciding on a drastically scaled down
peacetime force structure. The fate of the
paratroopers was not difficult to predict. Once
the paratroops had been 'transferred' to the
British, they were for all intensive purposes
abandoned by Canada. Lieutenant Ken Arril
recollected, "we called ourselves the forgotten
battalion. "58 Sergeant Art Stammers noted that
the "Canadian Army forgot we existed. "59 The
paratroopers at large felt no link with their
national army and received no visits from its
Commanders. Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser Eadie
plaintively stated that "Canada had forsaken us
for everything but pay and clothing. "60 The
paratroopers were never fully integrated with the
national army. In sum, they were orphans.
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Once peace broke out, the enigmatic debate
over a Canadian airborne capability began anew.
The first indication was not promising. Beginning
in May 1945 no training was conducted at the
parachute training centre since Army
Headquarters anticipated no requirement for
airborne forces in the post-war army. 61 In the
following months it became apparent that the 1st
Canadian Parachute Battalion was in fact
designated for disbandment. Its existence was
prolonged only long enough to serve as an
administrative tool to process the orderly release
of those unit members who did not sign on to
serve in the Canadian Army Pacific Force. 62 The
unit was officially disbanded 30 September
1945. 63 Most of its members took their release
a:nd rejoined the ·civilian world. For the
paratroopers who remained in the Active Force,
the question of continuing airborne service was
anything but bright.
The argument in regard to the relevance of
an airborne capability in Canada had returned
to its original position. Namely, there was no
direct threat to Canada. Therefore, there was no
need for specialized paratroops. A debt conscious
government was aware that the war-weary public
held little sympathy for continued defence
expenditures or large forces. As a result, it was
decided to establish an Interim Force for a two
year period. This allowed the Department of
Defence time to carefully craft the military that
the government thought was sufficient to fulfill
the nation's new peacetime requirements.
Paratroopers were not part of that vision. The
cessation of parachute training at Shilo and the
disbandment of the only existing airborne
battalion were clear signals. One glimmer of hope
lay in the proposed.'Order of Battle' for the Post
War Militia (Reserve Army) in June 1945. For
planning purposes it included the possibility of
a parachute unit being perpetuated in the form
of a reserve infantry battalion, although no unit
was specifically designated. 64 However, this
thread was tenuous. Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser
Eadie, now in the capacity of a Reserve Force
officer, actively pressed for such a commitment.
He took his case to Major-General Church Mann,
the VCDS, whom he had known during the war
in 7 Brigade Headquarters. Eadie pressed Mann
for the conversion to airborne status of his
present unit, the Winnipeg Light Infantry. The
VCDS' response was brutally frank. He stated

that there was "no use for airborne" and went so
far as to suggest that Eadie "was living in the
past."65
This was not a unique outlook. The post-war
army was to be anything but extravagant. Mann's
sentiments were also representative of an
institution which was averse to the idea of 'elite'
or 'special' troops. Furthermore, the military
establishment failed to accept the premise that
there was a credible and pervasive role which
only the paratroopers could fill. This would
become the legacy of the nation's airborne forces.
Their fortunes would rise and fall like the waters
of a turbulent river, dependent on political
expediency and the support, or derision, of key
personalities. Nonetheless, ultimately it would
always become a question of relevance.
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